University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of Sciences
and Affiliated Societies

Nebraska Academy of Sciences

1982

The Improbability of Inductive Logic
Edward F. Becker
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, ebecker1@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/tnas
Becker, Edward F., "The Improbability of Inductive Logic" (1982). Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of Sciences and Affiliated
Societies. 499.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/tnas/499

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Nebraska Academy of Sciences at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of Sciences and Affiliated Societies by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

1982. Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of Sciences, X: 79-83.

THE IMPROBABILITY OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC
Edward F. Becker
Department of Philosophy
Un iversity of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

THE NATURE OF LOGIC

Various conceptions of the nature of logic are considered, leading
to the view that to have a logic is to have a method of calculating the
rationality of certain beliefs, or systems of beliefs, on the basis of syntactic properties of sentences. The possibility of developing an inductive logic is then considered in the light of this view. It is concluded
that the prospects for developing a complete inductive logic are not
good.

t

t

An inductive logic would presumably do for the notion of
inductive strength, or degree of confirmation, what a deductive logic does for the notion of validity. But what does a
deductive logic do for the notion of validity? What is an
inductive logic, anyway?

t

According to one traditional account, logic is the study of
inference, i.e., the study of the principles in accordance with
which people pass from one belief to another. On this account,
inductive logic would be the study of those inferences-e.g.,
from the belief that a theory's predictions have invariably come
out true to the belief that the theory itself is true- which qualify as inductive. Now surely there are such inferences; and,
surely they could be made an object of a study. Thus on this
conception of logic the possibility of there being such a thing
as an inductive logic would be beyond question.

INTRODUCTION

In some arguments, premises and conclusions are so related that if the former are true, so, necessarily, are the latter.
Arguments having this property are said to be valid; those
which lack it are said to be invalid. Some invalid arguments are
worthless, but others are not. Among the latter are many
arguments used by scientists, such as the arguments by which
laws are inferred from their instances. These arguments, one
wants to say, do not guarantee the truth of their conclusions,
but they nevertheless make them more probable. Though not
valid, they are inductively strong. Thus there arises the idea of
an inductive logic, a logic which would provide a method for
determining inductive strength, just as deductive logic provides a method for determining validity.

Of course there are some deductively invalid inferences
which also are not inductive. The conclusion that a man is in
for a bad day may be inferred from the premise that his moon
is in Aquarius, or from the premise that the local witch doctor
has put a curse on him. If logic is the study of the principles in
accordance with which people make inferences, then these
inferences, too, will fall within the purview of logic. In addition to deductive logic and inductive logic, there will be
religious logic, voodoo logic, astrological logic, and so on for
any type of inference that may be named. Perhaps it is this
line of thought which has led some writers to maintain that
there is a special logic of religious or ethical reasoning. Such
writers have tended to welcome this conclusion, apparently
on the ground that it makes religion and ethics seem every bit
as rational as science.

An inductive logic, if one could be developed, would
give insight into both the nature and the grounds of scientific
inference. The principles of such a logic would be the principles in accordance with which scientific reasoning proceeds,
and showing such principles to be logical would leave little
doubt as to their justifiability. The motives for developing an
inductive logic are thus clear. What is less clear is that such a
logic is actually possible. In recent years there has been heated
controversy on this point, with philosophers such as Carnap
and Hempel defending inductive logic, and other philosophers,
such as Popper, claiming that there can be no such thing. The
purpose of this paper is to consider whether anything worthy
of the name "inductive logic" could ever be developed.

Unfortunately, there is no stopping with ethics and religion. Suppose there is announced the development of a new
branch of logic, ginductive logic, which is the study of those
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inferences that people will accept after consuming a pint of
gin. Clearly there is a class of such inferences, and clearly they
could be made an object of a study; so if logic is the study of
inference, gin deductive logic must be considered one of the
branches of logic.
The absurdity of this conclusion shows that the conception of logic now before us is too broad. Logic involves the
study of inferences, but inferences can be studied without
doing logic. Narrower conceptions of the subject must be considered. One such narrower conception, developed by Quine
(1966), exploits the notion of a logical word. First, a class of
logical words is specified: "not," "or," "and," "all," "some,"
"=" (in the sense of identity) would be typical candidates
for membership. The logical truths are then defined as those
truths which invariably turn into other truths when any of
their expressions other than a logical word is replaced by a
grammatically acceptable substitute. Logic is then defined as
the study of logical truths. A pair of sentences will stand in
the relation of logical consequence just in case their corresponding conditional is logically true (Quine, 1966:80-81
and 110).
This conception rejects the credentials of voodoo logic
and astrological logic, while accepting those of the classical
logic of quantification with identity. Moreover it can accommodate such developments as modal logic and deontic logic
by adding expressions such as "it is necessary that" and "it
is obligatory that" to the list of logical words. (Quine did not
deny that modal logic is logic; only that it admits of an acceptable interpretation.)
Can this conception be so extended as to count inductive logic as a logic? At first sight, the answer may seem to be
''yes.'' "Probably" or "it is probable that" could be added to
the list of logical words. Truths containing only this expression
and other logical words essentially would then count as logical.
By analogy with the relation of logical consequence, the relation of confirmation between sentences P and Q would be
defmed as logical truth of the conditional (Probably (P~Q)I.
There is, however, a problem here. (P~QI is equivalent
to ('VPvQI. Now clearly the probability of a disjunction is
always at least as high as the probability of its least probable
disjunct. Thus the probability of ('VPvQI, and hence of
(P~QI will be high whenever the probability of P is low,
regardless of the probability of Q; similarly, the probability
of ('VPvQI and (P~QI will be high whenever the probability of Q is high. (Probably (P~Q)1 will therefore be true
whenever the probability of P is low or the probability of Q
is high, the probability of the other component notwithstanding.
Now consider what happens when P is a statement to

which our inductive logic assigns low probability. This means
that high probability must be assigned to (P~QI. Thus
(Probably (P~Q)I will count as a logical truth when "probably" is reckoned among the logical words. Hence, if confirmation of Q by P is equated with logical truth of (Probably
(P~Q)I, it will follow that P confirms Q, Similarly, every
statement to which our inductive logic assigns low probability will, on the conception of logic now before us, confum
any statement whatsoever. By similar reasoning it could be
shown that every statement to which our inductive logic assigns high probability will, on that same conception of logic,
be confirmed by any statement whatsoever.
The problem is that inductive logic, as standardly developed, disallows these results. On the standard conception, a
statement P confirms a statement Q just in case the probability of Q on the assumption that P is true is higher than it
would be without that assumption (Haack, 1978: 17; Skyrms,
1975:9-11). Mere high probability of Q or low probability
ofP is never sufficient, of itself, to insure that P confirms Q.
In contrast to standard deductive logic, which equates
consequence with logical truth of the corresponding conditional, standard inductive logic does not equate confirmation
of Q by P with logical truth of (Probably (P~Q)I. Thus
standard inductive logic does not, after all, count as logic
under Quine's conception.
Should this result be thought of as an objection to Quine
or as an objection to inductive logic? Consider an example.
Suppose it is proposed, as a principle of inductive logic, that
if a statement e is of the form (<I> a & W131 and a statement h
is of the form (y) (<I> 'Y ~ W 'Y)I, then e confums h. It might
be doubted, of course, that this principle is a co"ect one, but
what does not seem to be in doubt is that the principle is a
principle of inductive logic. On Quine's conception of logic,
establishing that the principle is a logical principle involves
finding some logical truth to which it corresponds. Since there
does not seem to be such a logical truth, and since, in any
event, it is implausible to make the logical character of the
principle depend upon finding such a truth, Quine's conception of logic as the study of so-called logical truths must be
rejected as too narrow, in that it excludes from the realm of
logic principles which clearly belong there.
If the class of "logical truths" is too narrow to encompass the principles involved in the study of logic, it is natural
to suppose that logic could be characterized as the study of
some broader class of truths, say the class of analytic truths.
This class would surely number among its members any principle of confirmation worthy of being included in an inductive
logic. Unfortunately, however, it also encompasses principles
which do not seem to belong to logic of any kind. "All horses
are animals" is presumably analytic, yet it does not, and
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should not, figure as a principle of any logic. The class of
analytic truths is thus seen to be too broad to be the subjectmatter oflogic.
This conclusion applies equally to the classes of a priori
truths and of necessary truths. "All horses are animals" is
a priori and necessary as well as analytic, and thus serves to
show that logic cannot be identified as the study of the truths
in anyone of these three traditional categories.
Another familiar proposal concerning the nature of logic
holds that logic is essentially metalinguistic: To be a logical
principle is to be a principle about expressions. As it stands
this is too broad: '''Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is true" would
count as a principle of logic. Still, this account seems to be on
the right track. Not all metalinguistic principles are logical,
but all logical principles are metalinguistic. Logical principles
can be distinguished from other metalinguistic principles by
the following characteristics: First, logical principles provide
the basis for making certain calculations (e.g., the calculations
involved in constructing a truth table); in this respect they
obviously differ from many other metalinguistic principles.
Second, logical principles effect, or at least aim to effect, a
reduction of non-syntactic properties of sentences to syntactic
properties of sentences. The calculations licensed by the principles are based on syntactic properties of sentences, but the
purpose of the calculations is to show that sentences have
certain non-syntactic properties (e.g., truth) or stand in certain
non-syntactic relations (e.g., implication). With what kinds of
non-syntactic properties is logic concerned? The answer seems
to be that logic is concerned with those properties and relations
that pertain to the rationality of our beliefs. Notions such as
validity and consistency, for example, are tied to our conception of rationality in that a person who believed a statement
known to be inconsistent, or who accepted the premises of
an argument known to be valid while rejecting its conclusion, would be regarded as irrational.
These points together lead to the following characterization: A logic is a system for determining the rationality of certain beliefs, or combinations of beliefs, by means of calculations based on syntactic properties of sentences. This account
fits syllogistic and quantificationallogic, as well as such further
developments as modal logic and deontic logic. It also excludes
such deviations as astrological logic, because failure to accept
the principles of astrology does not signify irrationality.
With regard to inductive logic the account gives reasonable
results without begging any question. It properly accords the
probability calculus the status of a partial inductive logic, in
that failure to assign probabilities in accordance with the calculus is a sufficient reason for ascribing irrationality. On the
other hand, the question whether there could be an inductive
logic going beyond the probability calculus is left unresolved.

The notions of rationality which inductive logic strives to
explicate-probability, confirmation, evidence-do indeed
form part of our conception of rationality. A person whose
beliefs violate the laws of probability, or are not well confirmed, or are not in accord with the evidence can justly be
called irrational. If, therefore, there were a system of principles on the basis of which questions of probability, confirmation, and evidence could be settled by calculation, such a
system would be a logic. On the other hand, no such system
of principles presently exists. According to the conception of
logic now before us, therefore, no complete system of inductive logic presently exists.
All of this-that the probability calculus is a partial inductive logic, that a general method for calculating probabilities and confirmation relations on the basis of syntactic
features would be an inductive logic, that there is not now a
complete inductive logic-accords with pre-analytic intuition.
Our account of logic thus seems to give reasonable results
for inductive logic, as well as for other types of logic. This
account may, therefore, be taken as providing at least some
clarification of the concept of logic, and the prospects for
inductive logic may be considered within the framework it
provides.

THE PROSPECTS FOR INDUCTIVE LOGIC
If logic is what we have said it is, what is to be made of
the question "Is inductive logic possible?" If logic in general
is concerned with the rationality of beliefs, inductive logic is
concerned with the rationality of beliefs arrived at inductively, with the rationality of what might be called inductively
determined beliefs. In accordance with what has now become
fairly common usage, "induction" can be understood to cover
not only inductive generalization, but any non-deductive inference in which the premises are observation-sentences. An
inductive logic would then be concerned with the rationality
of such inferences. It would provide a way of calculating, on
the basis of syntactical features of sentences, the extent to
which a hypothesis is confirmed (made probable by) certain
observations. The question whether such a logic is possible is
the question whether a method of calculating degrees of confirmation on the basis of syntactical features can be found.

A partial answer to this question is provided by the existence of the probability calculus. This calculus provides a
method for determining the probabilities of truth-functional
compounds, given a knowledge of the probabilities of their
components, together with a knowledge of their syntactical
(specifically truth-functional) structure. It thus constitutes a
partial inductive logic. Such a logic is thus not only possible
but actual.
It is clear, however, that much more could be hoped for,
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namely, a logic which allows determination of the probabilities of statements on the basis of more fine-grained syntactical
analysis, e.g., analysis of quantificational structure; or, a logic
which elucidates the relation between theory and observation,
e.g., between scientific laws and their instances. Whether a
logic fulfilling these aspirations can be constructed will now be
considered.
One argument against the possibility of an expanded
inductive logic could appeal to the allegedly holistic character
of confirmation. According to the holistic doctrine, championed in recent years by Quine, it is large blocks of theory,
rather than isolated sentences, which are confirmed by experience (Quine, 1953:41). If this view is correct, then, it
might be argued, no inductive logic could ever be developed,
for, if hypotheses do not even stand in relations of confirmation to observation reports, then, obviously, there could be no
such thing as determining whether such relations hold on the
basis of calculations.
The holistic view could, however, be treated as showing
not that inductive logic must be abandoned, but that it has
been misconceived. If inductive logic was supposed to codify a
relation of confirmation between isolated statements and their
evidence, then of course, holism would foreclose the possibility of inductive logic. But why must this conception of
inductive logic be accepted? Presumably inductive logic is
directed at the confirmation-relation. It need not be said, however, that observation-reports and isolated hypotheses are what
stand in this relation. Leaving the door open for holism, we
can be noncommital as to the nature of the statements that
get confirmed. If the holist is correct, it is theories that get
confirmed, but a theory can be regarded simply as a conjunction of statements. The question whether there could be an
inductive logic would then turn on the possibility of codifying the confirmation of theories by observation reports. An
affirmative answer to this question is obviously consistent with
holism.

In its insistence that whole theories rather than isolated
hypotheses are confirmed, holism affirms the complexity of
one side of the confirmation-relation. Barker (1965:226),
on the other hand, affirmed the complexity of the other side
of the relation, the evidential side. His view, in effect, was that
all inductive arguments are enthemematic. In advancing an
inductive argument, a speaker claims that his conclusion is
probable in the light of everything that we know. Thus,
In an inductive argument the explicitly stated premises are only a tiny part, although usually the most
noteworthy part, of the indefmitely vast amount of
information about the world upon which the conclusion depends. Each bit of this known but unstated
information has a bearing upon whether the argument

is inductively valid. But where reasoning involves
relevant premises so rich that we cannot be sure even
of stating them completely, we cannot expect to be
able to impute to the premises and conclusion any
specific logical form in virtue of which the argument
would be valid or invalid.
When Barker spoke of logical form, he had in mind what we
have called syntax; and when he spoke of an argument as being
inductively valid, he meant that its premises confirm its conclusion. He thus maintained, in effect, that there cannot be
syntactical criteria for confirmation.
Judging from the passage just quoted, it would appear
that Barker's argument for this view turns on his claim that
the premises of an inductive argument are so rich that "we
cannot be sure even of stating them completely." In short,
inability to state the premises of inductive arguments entails
the impossibility of inductive logic.
By way of assessing this entailment, imagine that there
were a way of calculating, on the basis of syntactic properties
of these sentences, whether e confirms h for every pair of sentences e and h. Surely under these circumstances an inductive
logic would be available. Yet at the same time, a way of determining what statements should be included among the suppressed premises of a given inductive argument might very well
be lacking. How is it that we could have an inductive logic and
yet still not be able to assess certain inductive arguments?
An answer emerges if the analogous situation is considered
with regard to deductive logic, where there actually is a calculus of the kind described. In this case there is clearly a logic,
yet in the case of many enthemematic arguments, it is not
possible to say how the missing premises should be supplied.
Such cases show that the applicability of logic is sometimes
limited by inability to state all premises of certain real-life
arguments. Similarly, in the case of inductive logic, inability
to state the premises of inductive arguments would show not
that inductive logic is impossible, but only that its applicability is limited. To have a logic, it is sufficient to be able to calculate certain relationships between sentences. A logic does
not tell us how to read others' minds, or to generate a list of
everything we know.
A more serious obstacle to the construction of an inductive logic emerges from Goodman's (1955: 17- 2 7 and 66-81)
work on the problem of lawlikeness. As was seen above, an
inductive logic involves syntactic criteria of confirmation. One
type of confirmation with which an inductive logician would
be particularly anxious to deal is the confirmation of scientific laws by their instances. At first it might seem that in this
case a syntactic criterion is near to hand. It could be said that
a statement of the form "All Fs are Gs" is confirmed by a
statement of the form "A is F and a is G." But this is where

Improbability of inductive logic 83
Goodman's problem comes in. As long as we think in terms of
statements like "All crows are black," our criterion of confirmation seems all right. Unfortunately not all statements of
the form "All Fs are Gs" are confirmed by their instances.
"All the men attending this football game are third sons,"
for example, is not confirmed by "Jones is attending this football game and is a third son." Generalizations confirmed by
their instances are termed "lawlike." The problem with our
proposed syntactic criterion of confirmation is that it would
incorrectly accord confirmation by their instances to nonlaw like generalizations. In order to treat the question of the
confirmation of scientific laws by their instances in our inductive logic, it would be necessary to distinguish, on syntactical grounds, between lawlike and non-Iawlike generalizations.
Unfortunately, this does not seem to be possible. "All crows
are black," and "All the men attending this game are third
sons" are both of the form "All Fs are Gs." They are, in
short, syntactically equivalent. The problem of the confirmation of scientific laws by their instances thus appears to be
beyond the scope of any inductive logic. Hence, insofar as
inductive logic is conceived as aspiring to deal with this problem, it must be concluded that such a logic is probably impossible.
Does it then follow that induction, and therefore science
itself, is illogical or irrational? No. Construction of any logic
is begun with a stock of inferences regarded as rationally
justified, and another stock of inferences regarded as not
rationally justified. Some syntactic relation between sentences
which is coextensive with the relation of rational justification
for the sentences in question is then sought. To succeed in
this effort is to invent a logic. It would be a mistake, however,
to view the construction of the logic as demonstrating the

rationality of the inferences in question. On the contrary:
the rationality of the inferences is presupposed in the construction of the logic. The question whether a logic can be
constructed for a given class of inferences is not the question
whether those inferences are rational; it is the question
whether their rationality has a syntactic correlate. The conclusion that inductive inferences cannot be treated formally
should shake our faith in the rationality of science no more
than Godel's incompleteness theorem has shaken our faith in
the rationality of mathematics.
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